The Parallax Brief

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Unrepentant Subjectivity on Economics, Politics, Defence, Foreign Policy, and Russia

Time for RBS, HSBC, and LloydsTSB-HBOS to become British Sberbanks

News slithered uncomfortably down the wires yesterday that the British government had agreed to convert its GBP5 bn of Royal Bank of Scotland preference shares into ordinary shares, taking its stake in the beleaguered bank to 70%. RBS is now, effectively, a nationalized government bank.

Predictably, the denizens of the Right have savaged the decision. On his excellent blog, John Redwood, made some wholly rational points about the move:

“…RBS will announce losses of over £6 billion, or one third of the government capital… The government is now risking huge sums of money. Of course I hope they get the terms of the scheme right and that credit starts to flow again. Even if that were it happen, I will still worry about the high risk…”

Mr. Redwood is reasonable, but wrong. He is right to argue that we don’t really want the government to be risking our money. He is also correct to question, as he did earlier in his piece, whether the government should be dabbling in nationalization in this day and age. “Didn’t we,” Mr. Redwood and many others from the Right seem to be asking, “get past this in the 70s?”

But the Right is completely missing the point. In ordinary times, people like Mr. Redwood would be right. But these aren’t ordinary times. This process is not ideal, but given the alternatives, we must hold a pomander under our noses and plough ahead.

Willem Buiter, Professor of European Political Economy at the London School of Economics and former chief economist of the EBRD and member of the MPC, argues in his latest blog for the FT that the banks are:

“…dead banks walking, held up both by actual government financial support (directly through capital injections and indirectly through such facilities as the Special Liquidity Scheme and the Treasury’s guarantee on new bank debt) and through the anticipation of future government financial support.”

And he’s right. These banks would have gone bust but for implicit or tacit government support. We tried doing nothing and letting banks go bankrupt between 1929 and 1932, and it led to the Great Depression, so I would respectfully suggest that repeating that course of action would not necessarily be best for the country. This leaves us with two options: bail outs or nationalizations, of which nationalization is surely most desirable.

Nationalizing the banking system, along the Swedish model, would give us the best chance of defibrillating inter-bank lending, boosting credit provision, and, most important, would provide tax payers the best chance of getting a return on their investment in the long run, while avoiding moral hazard by wiping out current shareholders and the banks’ egregious management.

What the Right need to understand is that we who argue for nationalization aren’t communists, and would never countenance such actions in usual circumstances – even in a ‘normal recession’. But without government support, the British banking system will collapse, consigning the country to untold misery and hardship. None of us wants that. Given the remaining options, nationalization best fits the bill. And better nationalize now than try injecting capital, buying up bad debt – and generally throwing the kitchen sink at the problem in the hope of avoiding the inevitable – only to have to nationalize every major bank anyway.

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